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“To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you — and therefore 
before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its 
entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be 
dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”  !
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace,” UN Speech, 1953 !!
& the war was only in its infancy then 
learning how to kill us in the morning & in the evening 
in houses & on street corners, in Humvees & when 
we return home the war is most proficient at killing us 
one at a time two at a time !
—Maurice Emerson Decaul, “& the War Was in Its Infancy Then” !!
“The need for exchange is clear.” !
—Laura Nader, What the Rest Think of the West, p. xix !!!!!!!!!!
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Acronyms !
DoD Department of Defense 
ICC International Criminal Court 
IGO Intergovernmental Organization 
ILO International Liberal Order 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
UN United Nations 
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction 
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On American Exceptionalism !
“The greatness of America lies not in being more enlightened than any other nation, but rather in 
her ability to repair her faults.” 
—Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America !
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM HAS been interpreted and re-interpreted as everything from 
a double-edged ideology to a domestic political division (Lipset, 1996, & Jouet, 2017). At times 
it has been called a myth and at others given mythological importance (Hodgson, 2009, Bossie & 
Knoblock, 2011). Notions of American greatness and distinction have inspired and  paved the 
way for the founding of such international institutions as the League of Nations, United Nations, 
World Bank, and IMF (Easterly, 2006, & Cottrell, 2018). As often as it has been attributed with 
serving as key inspiration for these multilateral institutions, it has been accused of helping to 
justify unnecessary wars and undermine the very international liberal order it made possible 
(Robertson, 2006; Bacevich, “Tragedy Renewed,” and The Limits of Power).  !
Whether interpreting its darker or brighter sides, however, a single dimension of American 
Exceptionalism threads through the literature at large: This is the capacity of those who seek to 
achieve a political objective to utilize American Exceptionalism as a means to an end. Since the 
US’s inception, American Exceptionalism has played an essential part in sanctioning American 
policy, both at home and abroad. In this respect, Exceptionalism occupies a place very similar to 
religion in the state apparatus of US government: It legitimizes (Fox, 2011). Measures of the US’ 
superiority have been used time and again to excuse and/or permit any and all actions 
administrations have resolved to take, necessary or otherwise, humanitarian or colonial: from the 
quintessential role the country and its leaders have played in the founding of multilateral 
institutions (Cottrell, 2018) to the colonizing of the Philippines and Iraq war (Karnow, 1989, and 
Haass, 2008). !
This paper will devote the bulk of its energies to reexamining the Iraq war, specifically the role 
American Exceptionalism played in implementing US policy in the lead-up to the invasion, as 
well as in legitimizing the actions of the US. Several other historical cases will be examined in 
brief as well, including the founding of the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as 
the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Rather than testifying to the fact or fiction of 
American Exceptionalism, as so many have done before (Friedman, Mandelbaum, & Walt, 2011, 
Koh, 2003, Tilman, 2005, Bacevich, The Limits of Power, Hodgson, 2009), this paper instead 
 4
argues that American Exceptionalism serves as a vital legitimizing factor for the United States 
government, which it uses to justify adhering to a different set of rules from those other nations 
are expected to follow. Sometimes this takes the form of the United States exempting itself from 
UN treaties or starting wars in defiance of international law, and at others it means embarking on 
greatly ambitious multilateral projects. The ultimate goal of the paper is to provide a new 
working definition for American Exceptionalism as a tool employed by US government to give 
more legitimacy to its actions, and the hope is that the line of thinking presented here will be 
applicable to case studies made of government policies and actions, as well as providing a new 
way of understanding the methods by which the United States government functions. !
≤≥ !
THE HISTORY OF American Exceptionalism predates the origins of the US itself. French 
traveler Alexis De Tocqueville is most often attributed with having invented the idea of 
American Exceptionalism in his seminal work Democracy in America, thoughts attributing a 
special significance to the country had long been in circulation (Lipset, 1996, Hodgson, 2009).  !
However, even before the release of De Tocqueville’s work, America was being distinguished by 
citizens and settlers in ways which suggested an inherent superiority over the rest of the world. 
Particularly noteworthy among these is John Winthrop’s “Model of Christian Charity,” speech 
(1630), in which the governor urged Puritan settlers sailing with him aboard the Arabella to treat 
the land to which they traveled as a “city upon a hill,” echoing the words of Jesus’ Sermon on the 
Mount (Chace, 1997). Winthrop’s speech has been canonized as one of the “sacred texts of that 
account of history known as ‘American Exceptional-ism,’” (Hodgson, 2009, p. 1). !
Despite Winthrop’s and De Tocqueville’s roles in developing the idea of American 
Exceptionalism, the first recorded use of the term, would not appear until the 20th century, and, 
as with Tocqueville, would also be originate from a non-American. In 1929, Joseph Stalin, 
speaking with American communist Jay Lovestone about the lack of revolutionary will in the 
United States, used the term not to laud but rather to critique America’s difference (McCoy, 
2012, Morgan, 1999). What troubled the dictator was the seeming inability of members of the 
US proletariat to fall in line with the Marxist model, unionize appropriately, and make the 
transition to socialism. This resistance was in part a symptom of America’s unique history: 
Rather than evolving out of a feudalist system, America was conceived as a democracy, 
distinguishing it historically from all other modern states (Tocqueville 1840, Lipset & Marks, 
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2000). Where Stalin’s qualms have faded into history, however, Tocqueville’s observations have 
acquired a fresh relevance in the 21st century, thanks to the efforts of the GOP. !
Over the course of Obama’s presidency the Republican Party worked to redefine American 
Exceptionalism, transforming popular understanding of the idea to suggest the US possesses an 
inherent superiority over other nations. This was done to give a shot in the arm to the 
Republican’s efforts to defame president Obama. Members of the GOP such as Mitt Romney, 
Newt Gingrich, and Donald J. Trump all made claims attacking Obama’s belief in “American 
Exceptionalism,” as they defined it  (Jaffe, 2015 & Jouet, 2017). This was a far cry from 
Tocqueville’s comprehension of what “exceptional,” meant as relates to the US, which for him 
was the way in which its history merely distinguished it from other nations, in ways which might 
be better at times and worse at others.  !
Though these sentiments of superiority — religiously motivated or not — have always been a 
part of the fabric of American society, what is vital to understand is that the term “American 
Exceptionalism” has not always referred to an inherent superiority possessed by the United 
States — this is a recent development. However, America’s difference from the rest of the world 
has always been a topic of discussion (Lipset, 2000 & Tocqueville, 1840), and has often been 
used to set America apart in a positive light (Wilson, 1902 & Winthrop, 1630). Of the new shift 
to American Exceptionalism standing solely for American greatness, Varon (2011) has noted that 
there are real risks present in such patriotic flattery, namely the “continued inattention to 
problems warranting urgent concern,” (p. 124).  !
≤≥ !
THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE traditionally defines American Exceptionalism as the idea or 
reality of the US’ uniqueness among nations, due to its history and values (Dunne & Mulaj, 
2010, Britton, 2006). Perhaps the most succinct definition offered for understanding American 
Exceptionalism in the 21st century is that provided by Patman (2006), who categorizes American 
Exceptionalism as the “informal ideology that endows Americans with the conviction that their 
nation is an exemplary one,” (p. 964). The results of this perception of self as exemplary have 
given rise to a sense of duty to improve the state of the world (Easterly, 2006). Over the course 
of modern history, this has taken many forms, from the vital assistance America provided in 
forming IGOs to the ways it has sought to model other nations after its own institutions through 
military conquest (Karnow, 1989; Phillips, 2007; Zinn, 2008).  
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American Exceptionalism has been understood in a range of ways covering all ends of the 
political spectrum, from being evidenced by attitudes of anti-governmentalism and anti-
intellectualism (Jouet, 2017), to the capacity of Americans to focus on the “here and 
now,” (Friedman & Mandelbaum, 2011). Hodgson (2009) has warned about the dangers of 
viewing America’s difference from the rest of the world as something solely to tout and praise. 
Strong arguments also exist rebuffing claims that the United States’ “exceptional” nature does 
more good than harm for the rest of the world (Friedman, Mandelbaum, & Walt, 2011). !
In many ways, the argument over America’s place in the world today is staged over how 
exceptional it is (Avery & Mclaughlin, 2013). In the 20th and 21st centuries, presidents use the 
idea of American Exceptionalism at every given opportunity to invoke feelings of “goodness, 
righteousness and civilization,” in citizens (Ibid., p. 172). This is to say that even before the GOP 
turned the phrase “American Exceptionalism” into an unchallengeable assertion of American 
greatness, the idea of the United States being distinct from other nations was enough to evoke 
feelings of patriotic goodwill in US citizens. Come the collapse of the Soviet Union, many felt 
American superiority to be all but confirmed, as the US suddenly found itself the lone 
superpower in a post-cold war era (Hodgson, 2009). Though material wealth and power may be 
supplied as ‘evidence’ for the idea that America is inherently superior to other countries, it is the 
suggestion that America is unconditionally superior from which the concept draws its true 
strength (Ibid.). !
Nevertheless, the US sees itself as and acts like the “indispensable nation,” (Bacevich, The 
Limits of Power). Many do in fact find this feeling legitimate, such as Koh (2003), who notes 
that “the United States remains the only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real 
resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed 
to international law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights.” (p. 1489). Sure enough, 
America’s sudden enjoyment of unilateral power read to some as a unique opportunity to create 
international change. Smith (1994) argued no nation had a role as vital to altering and rectifying 
autocratic states and regimes in the post-cold war era as the US. Coupled with the notion of 
American Exceptionalism, the US’ new preponderance helped justify intervention as a 
quintessential component of combatting non-Western ideologies and forms of government 
(Easterly, 2006). Perhaps in their raw form utterances acknowledging American Exceptionalism 
would be incapable of galvanizing extreme acts such as direct intervention, Bacevich (“Tragedy 
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Renewed”) has noted the tradition fuels a deep-seated need America possesses to demonize its 
enemies, and it is this which mobilizes the spirit of superiority within.  1
!
≤≥ !
EXPRESSIONS OF SUPERIORITY in American thought and rhetoric appear in a multiplicity 
of forms. This is because American Exceptionalism fuels the drive of individuals across all 
political lines. Hodgson (2009) notes that Martin Luther King, Jr. and segregationist George 
Wallace alike were believers in American Exceptionalism, although two more opposite 
interpretations might have been hard to come by. For Hodgson himself, American exceptionalism 
has to do not with the inferiority of others, but the inherent superiority so many Americans 
believe exists in themselves and their country. !
Three particular varieties of American Exceptionalism inform most commonly articulated 
understandings of this superiority complex. These expressions of exceptionalism whose roots are 
religious (in this paper, the “Winthropian form”), based on the valor of the United States’ 
government and legal framework (the “Tocquevillian form”), and/or based on the US’ role in the 
world (the “Wilsonian form”). The last of these frequently melds with the other two; while these 
three varieties are by no means mutually exclusive, there are certain components within each that 
can be separated from the others and examined for deeper understanding. !
Winthropian exceptionalism does not just acknowledge America’s religious background, but 
argues that background to be reason enough to declare the United States superior, setting the 
country apart for its purported hallowed heritage (phrases such as “One nation under God,” being 
a prime example). George W. Bush is perhaps one of the politicians best known in recent history 
for his deep religious conviction. In 1999, the former president cited the political philosopher or 
thinker he felt he most identified with to be Jesus Christ, and claimed throughout the 2000 
elections that he believed God wanted him to be president (Miller, 2001). We are reminded of 
Winthrop’s own oration, revelatory in the way it associated early ideas of America with Christian 
thought, which continues to shed light on the current relationship between religion and 
government in the country today: Over 90% members of the House of Representatives and 
Senate are Christian (Pew Research Center, 2015) and 89% of Americans believe in God 
(Gallup, 2016). It is no surprise, then, that a strong link between politics and religion would exist 
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 The question for another paper is whether or not attitudes of exceptionalism can survive without attitudes of 1
superiority. And how does America’s own legacy of racism intersect with these?
in this country (Barber, 2012); the proportion of Americans who assign importance to their 
religious belief has long been far greater than that of other Western societies (Lipset, 1996). !
Tocquevillian exceptionalism focuses, rather, on America’s legal and political institutions, and 
the ways in which it is set apart because of the documents that have informed the nature of its 
government — namely, the constitution. Tocquevillian exceptionalism in particular embraces US 
sovereignty and the tradition of Exemptionalism because of its admiration of the constitution, 
often prioritizing American interests over international law (Ignatieff, 2005 & Spiro, 2000). At its 
core, exemptionalism “encourages US administrations, when deemed necessary, to exempt 
themselves from the rules that others are expected to follow,” (Foot, 2008, p. 709). The US does 
indeed treat international law differently from the rest of the world, and more than once has 
refused to sign almost unanimous conventions or follow the rules of Just War. !
Wilsonian exceptionalism differs from the previous two varieties in that it turns its attentions to 
the rest of the world. Grown out of the Winthropian and Tocquevillian traditions, Wilsonian 
exceptionalism encourages an interventionist spirit, one that seeks to “fix” other nations that are 
seen as being less enlightened, due to religious and/or governmental differences. Hodgson’s 
(1993/4) critique of the Wilsonian tradition in particular does a terrific job of assessing its many 
flaws, including “a veiled but real willingness to play the bully, a considerable ignorance of the 
realities of the world, and a miscalculation of domestic political mood and forces,” (p. 5). Both 
Democrats and Republicans have identified with Wilson and what they refer to as “Neo-
Wilsonianism,” which has been critiqued for assuming one can know what is best for the other 
states of the world, particularly those not in the canonical “West,” (Hodgson, 2009 & Easterly, 
2006). !
What all these forms of exceptionalism have in common is their tendency to promote feelings or 
lead to belief in the inherent “greatness,” of America. This comes across especially in the 
discussion of values which the US holds dear, which are often misaligned with America’s 
historical record of behavior as well as with the country’s interests. As Kassel (2015) notes, “by 
laying claim to the ideals of equality democracy, and human rights, the United States holds itself 
to a higher standard in word, while trouncing those values in deed.” There is perhaps no better 
case of such “trouncing” to be found in the 21st century than that of the Iraq War. !
Exceptionalism & The Iraq War !
“Someone will always want to mobilize 
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Death on a massive scale for economic  
Domination or revenge. And the task, taken 
As a task, appeals to the imagination.”  
—Robert Hass, “Bush’s War” !
IN FEBRUARY OF 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein stood before the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and gave a formal address concerning the future of the Arab world and the state of 
Israel. Over the course of the speech he acknowledged America’s rise as a unilateral power in 
international affairs, blaming this emergence primarily on the Soviet Union’s steady decline. 
Hussein went on to predict that it was probable the US would use its newfound preeminence in 
coming years to ignore international law and flout the ILO other nations abided by (Hussein, 
2001). !
For all Saddam’s criticisms, it would be less than a year before Iraq breached international law 
itself, invading the neighboring country of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Then-president George H. 
W. Bush managed to quickly assemble a US-led coalition in response and, endorsed by the UN 
security council, ousted Saddam Hussein’s troops from Kuwait. The conflict, called the Gulf 
War, turned out to be a lot more short-lived than anticipated, with Iraqi forces utterly outgunned 
by the US’ more advanced weaponry. Allied forces suffered 378 casualties, while tens of 
thousands of Iraqis were killed (Kidder & Oppenheim, 2007).  Hussein was denounced as a 
tyrant and a terrorist, both for his attack on Kuwait as well as for those crimes against humanity 
he had committed in the past (Robertson, 2008). Ironically, until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a 
vital strategic point for controlling circulation of oil worldwide, the US government had been 
relatively silent regarding Saddam’s tarnished human rights record (Ali, 2002). !
There was an opportunity at the end of the Gulf War to oust Saddam from power, but both 
president Bush Sr. and defense secretary Dick Cheney decided against it, as they believed the 
allied troops would have to become occupying forces in Iraq, a guess proved all too correct a 
decade later, in the Iraq invasion of 2003. The major psychological result of Gulf War, however, 
had nothing to do with Saddam himself. The ease with which the allies’ won the conflict, due to 
advance planning and technological superiority, was fuel to the fire of the “Big-Dick” complex 
taking hold of the US government now that it was the lone great power on the world stage. With 
none left to oppose America, any and everything seemed possible. !
Cut forward a decade. September 20th, 2001. Nine days have passed since Al-Qaeda’s attacks 
upon the world trade center and the pentagon, and attempted attack on the white house. An open 
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letter to President George W. Bush, signed by intellectuals Francis Fukuyama, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
William Kristol, and others, is written urging the president take action against Iraq. “It may be 
the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. 
But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the 
eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq,” (Fukuyama et al., 2001). These academics were not the only 
Americans interested in invading Iraq. The vulcans, the higher-level members of Bush’s 
administration, had a vested interest in intervening there as well (Mann, 2004). The very night of 
9/11, cabinet members were already discussing possible invasion scenarios (Frontline, 2008). !
The national security and foreign policy team around Bush already, prior to 9/11, were 
determined to exercise US imperial power in what is seen as a genuinely unipolar moment — as 
opposed to the international reality we are now experiencing, in 2017. The US power was seen as 
unmatched and at its helm were Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the rest of the self-proclaimed “Vulcans” 
who wanted to use it. In 2000 they had not yet found how and to what end. The war on terror had 
arrived, and here was their chance. !
From the September 15th meeting of the Bush cabinet at Camp David, Wolfowitz had an interest 
in pursuing Iraq (Whipple, 2017). However, this made no sense at the time. Before the month 
was out, nonetheless, Bush would convene alone with Rumsfeld and ask him to draw up a battle 
plan for Iraq (Frontline, 2008, Whipple, 2017). For Bush, the pursuit of Saddam was not just 
political, but also personal — Saddam had attempted and failed to assassinate Bush’s father in 
1993, and was promising monetary rewards to the families of suicide bombers even after the 
events of 9/11 (Whipple, 2017). !
Following the attacks of 9/11, the US sought to “shore up the int’l order by infusing it with a 
commitment to democratic transformation,” (Kissinger, 2014, p. 322). The invasion of Iraq 
would come to prove to be the first attempt at initiating this proposed global shift to democracy. !
At its onset, the American public was very supportive of the war on terror (Zinn, 2003).  
Retribution was being called for, and Al-Qaeda was not a big enough target alone. Conflict was 
being proposed with a state which, to the best of the US government’s knowledge, was 
uninvolved with the events of September 11th. The vulcans were eager to address the Iraq issue, 
and over the course of the next two years would search for evidence to justify invasion, as well 
as harangue other states to support such an action (Frontline, 2008 and Hare, 2004). When 
insufficient support could be obtained at the UN Security Council, the US opted instead for a 
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unilateral invasion, aided only by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had been advised by 
other members of his administration not to pursue the war (Gaskarth, 2011). This unwillingness 
to abide with international law is nothing new. Ignatieff (2005) refers to the phenomenon as 
“exemptionalism”: Americans will use their purported uniqueness to justify following a different 
set of rules from those other states are supposed to abide by. !
If it hadn’t been weapons of mass destruction it would have been something else: Paul 
Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Francis Fukuyama, Jean Kirkpatrick (etc. ad 
infinitum) saw it as the necessary extension to the War on Terror. The UN security council voted 
to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply,” (see UNSC Resolution 1441).  !
In the final hours leading to war, when the ultimatum was passed to Saddam Hussein that he and 
his sons had 48 hours to surrender, as the clock ran out, with no sign of either surrender or an 
admission of possession of nuclear weapons in sight, many in the administration — including the 
president himself — felt, “the only logical conclusion was that he had something to hide,” (Bush, 
2010, p. 224). !
The US’ patience with Saddam and the UN alike ran thin, and it invaded Iraq unilaterally. !
There are a host of criticisms to level against the Iraq War, among which are the lack of a link to 
Al-Qaeda or 9/11, the unilateral action taken by the United States without a UN mandate, setting 
a dangerous precedent, and the ultimate discovery of zero WMDs in the country (Visser, 2010, p. 
30). Rather than extensively dissect these mistakes, American Exceptionalism’s role in informing 
key cabinet members’ legitimizing of the actions they proposed to take will be examined. Three 
members of the administration — Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney — will be examined 
individually, and a set of quotes from other sources will also be scrutinized. !
≤≥ !
IN A SPEECH given at the military academy “The Citadel,” during the 2000 election campaign, 
George W. Bush framed his perception of America’s role in a pre-9/11 ILO. “In the world of our 
fathers, we have seen how America should conduct itself…We have seen power exercised 
without swagger and influence displayed without bluster. We have seen the modesty of true 
strength, the humility of real greatness. We have seen American power tempered by American 
character. And I have seen all of this personally and closely and clearly,” (Bush, 1999). Here, 
Bush speaks to a historical greatness he sees the US as possessing, one that stems in part from its 
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conduct in previous wars. Obviously, he is not taking into account both sides of America’s 
checkered history abroad, given his omission of the failures in the Vietnam War and elsewhere, 
choosing instead to focus on all the country has achieved. Nevertheless, it is clear that for Bush 
that the actions of former US administrations contribute to the “real greatness,” the country 
possesses under new ones. Rather than judging individual administrations here on their own 
merits, he is choosing instead to employ a reductivism that allows him to laud the country as a 
whole, for the actions of a few.  !
As early as the 2000 election campaign Bush was asked what his administration would do if 
Saddam Hussein was suspected of being “close to acquiring a nuclear weapon,” to which he 
responded, “He’d pay a price…The price is force, the full force and fury of a reaction,” (Miller, 
2001, p. 209). This stands in contrast with the statement of leveled, tempered use of power made 
above in Bush’s 1999 speech at The Citadel: It shows that even before the attacks of September 
11th, 2001 — which would make frequent appearances in the administration’s rhetoric when 
arguing for war with Iraq — that Bush’s cabinet was not opposed to the possibility of a pre-
emptive attack against Iraq. !
Once the attacks of September eleventh, 2001 did occur, Bush’s response was clear: “America 
was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the 
world,” (Avery & Mclaughlin, 2013, p. 173). The president’s message for the public was that the 
US had been attacked not for its mistakes abroad, or its flaws, but because of an inherent 
superiority, which he did not follow up by providing any grounded evidence for. Rather than use 
the shock of 9/11 to not only construct a policy for going after those responsible and turning the 
eye inward, to ask what role the US could have had in inspiring such an attack against it, Bush 
chose to wage a War against Terror, a nebulous enemy that could not be struck by drone or 
bombed out of existence. The administration spent little time reflecting and got right down to the 
nastier business of reaction. !
In his announcement of the war against terror, George W. Bush said “This crusade…this war on 
terror is going to take a while,” (Phillips, p. 308). Here, in his connection of the endeavors the 
US was set to embark upon with the holy, we see echoes of Winthropian Exceptionalism, as the 
battle became one in the minds of many — the president himself, perhaps — one of biblical 
proportion, and simplified to a matter of good against evil. A mistaken utterance or no, this 
choice to use the word “crusade,” imparted a Christian sanction upon the matter of the war 
against terror, dividing it along religious lines in a way reminiscent of Samuel P. Huntington’s 
“Clash of Civilizations.”  
 13
!
Calling the citizens of America to military action in a 2002 speech, Bush said “We want to be a 
Nation that serves goals larger than self. We have been offered a unique opportunity, and we 
must not let this moment pass. My call tonight is for every American to commit at least two 
years, 4,000 hours over the rest of your lifetime, to the service of your neighbors and your 
nation.” This was an active attempt to galvanize the population to take part in a latent 
militarization the kind which the administration had seemed intent on avoiding (One of 
Rumsfeld’s key objectives in the Iraq strategy was to have as few boots on the ground as 
possible): It was clear that Bush and his cohort were planning for war. Also worth noting is the 
sense of obligation which the president refers to in this passage. “We must not let this moment 
pass,” feels more an order from on high than it does a suggested approach, and the feeling about 
the phrase is one of righteousness. One must keep in mind that what Bush is essentially saying 
with this line is that it is the responsibility of the American public to ensure that the response to 
the uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s possible possession of WMDs is to not let wait and find out 
whether Saddam does or does not hold them. Rather, the doubt surrounding their existence 
should be used to mobilize the US and other members of the ILO to war with Iraq. A year later, 
this would become a reality. !
In a speech made in early 2003, Bush again referred to American soldiers, discussing their moral 
inclinations. “[Members of our Armed Forces] know that America's cause is right and just: 
liberty for an oppressed people, and security for the American people,” (Bush, 2003). Here, the 
soldiers are being spoken for and America framed as not only a correct country, but one capable 
of dispensing justice internationally. There is truth to this. Wanting to depose a regime as brutish 
as Saddam’s is by no means an ignoble goal: Rather, the methods employed are where the 
sleaziness seems to seep in. For Bush, it became a matter of focusing on the US’ perseverance 
and morality, rather than the ways in which this would be imposed upon others. When the 
language turned to that of certain invasion, it was with an ultimatum attached — Saddam’s 
continued reign and America’s own freedom were portrayed as incompatible. As the president 
put it, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: the survival of liberty in our 
land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands,” (Ikenberry et. al, 2009, p. 1) !
≤≥ !
DONALD HENRY RUMSFELD was secretary of defense for president Bush, and played a key 
role in the lead-up to war with Iraq. In a 2002 DoD news briefing on the matter of finding 
WMDs in the country, he uttered his most popular quote; “[A]s we know, there are known 
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knowns…things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns…we know there 
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't 
know we don't know…it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones,” (Rumsfeld, 
“DoD News Briefing”). Rumsfeld was well-known for his evasive language and penchant for the 
unspecific (Seely, 2003). Ironically, a single line from the Qur’an’s Sura of Youssef, read alone, 
does a far better job of surmising the US’ policy towards Iraq as it grappled with the idea of a 
pre-emptive strike; “we do not bear witness except to what we have known, and we could not 
keep watch over the unseen.” (Qur’an, 12:81). Rumsfeld’s knack for reductiveness would be 
revealed again when, on April 11th, 2003, in response to a question posed about the looting 
occurring in Iraq, Rumsfeld bluntly replied “Stuff Happens.” The laissez-faire nature of the 
statement was impactful enough to become the title of a David Hare play (Hare, 2004). !
Further into 2002, as Rumsfeld and others continued to develop the US’ policy toward Iraq, the 
secretary of defense was asked to present to Congress. In his opening statements, he claimed, 
“Our job today…is to try to connect the dots before the fact. It's to try to anticipate vastly more 
lethal attacks before they happen. And to try to make the right decisions as to whether we should 
take anticipatory self-defense. Actions or preventative actions before such an attack 
occurs,” (Rumsfeld, “U.S. Policy Toward Iraq”). Rumsfeld is discussing the attack of Iraq and 
the ousting of Saddam Hussein from power before the dictator has an opportunity to acquire 
WMDs. This is a speech being made in light of the fact that there are UNSCOM members 
searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction who have not found any evidence as to their 
existence. What Rumsfeld is suggesting is the US consider launching a pre-emptive attack on 
Iraq, in direct breach of international law and the tenets of Just War. Rumsfeld is able to make 
these points and suggestions at all because of the spirit of exemptionalism which runs through 
American political culture, directly linked to the intense feelings citizens of the US feel for their 
constitution; it is Tocquevillian Exceptionalism at work. Farther into the speech, Rumsfeld again 
hints at the possibility — desirability, even — of a pre-emptive strike, claiming, “The goal must 
be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people.” !
Closer to the events of 9/11, Rumsfeld said in an interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, “We 
have a choice, either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that 
they live, and we have — we chose the latter,” (Rumsfeld, 2001). Here again we see attitudes of 
American superiority reflected, as Rumsfeld tacitly acknowledges that America could change 
some parts of its fabric, perhaps, even, improve, but then goes on to reject this notion and instead 
says that, rather than do this, a more American vision and way of life will be imposed upon 
others who do not conform. Although there is the matter of international justice to be considered 
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for criminals, those who were uninvolved in the 9/11 attacks would have been better left out of 
this revenge strategy. The administration’s willingness to force change on others without even 
considering changing themselves combines the matter of exceptionalism and the unipolar 
moment to create what would become the debacle of post-Saddam Iraq. 
!
≤≥ !
DICK CHENEY HAD at various points both supported and opposed the invasion of Iraq. While 
working as secretary of defense for George Bush, Sr., he cautioned against moving into Iraq after 
the Gulf War to oust Saddam from power due to a fear of becoming entrenched in a nation 
building project (Kidder & Oppenheim, 2007). Immediately following the events of September 
11th, 2001, he again suggested the Bush administration keep out of Iraq, saying “If we go after 
Saddam Hussein, we lose our rightful place as good guy,” (Baker, 2013, p. 145). Here again we 
detect elements of American Exceptionalism in an administration member’s worldview, 
envisioning the US as having a “rightful place” as benevolent power.  !
Just a year later, however, Cheney’s tune had changed — and Rumsfeld was with him. Following 
a briefing with a group of senators about weapons in Iraq, Max Cleland, one of the senators 
present, wrote in his impressions of the meeting that “[Rumsfeld and Cheney] have already made 
the decision to go to war and to them that is the only option,” (Ibid, p. 217). Only a few days 
before the meeting with Cleland and other senators, on August 26th, 2002, Cheney had indeed 
said in a speech, “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction,”  
(The White House, 2002). This was not only misinformation on the Vice President’s part, but 
also a way to coax the US into the pre-emptive strike which Rumsfeld was at this time 
advocating for, one that would happen in defiance of international law, in the fashion of 
Tocquevillian Exceptionalism. !
Cheney would admit that same year that he was familiar “[W]ith the arguments against taking 
action in the case of Saddam Hussein. Some concede that Saddam is evil…but that, until he 
crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should rule out any preemptive 
action. That logic seems to me to be deeply flawed. The argument comes down to this: yes, 
Saddam is as dangerous as we say he is, we just need to let him get stronger before we do 
anything about it,” (Cheney, 2002). This was a gross oversimplification of the actual 
interpretations of those who opposed the conflict, and in true Tocquevillian Exceptionalist 
fashion, also flew in the face of international law. Here, Cheney is framing the case for not 
engaging in pre-emptive action as one made solely out of foolishness, rather than acknowledging 
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the dangerous precedent which would be said by engaging in unilateral action outside of 
permission for such an attack being provided by the UN. !
Several years after the invasion began, at a black tie dinner at Washington Hilton, April, 2008, 
lauding DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Cheney remarked, “One 
thing we didn’t have a lot of in Desert Storm was the unmanned aerial vehicle. But thanks to 
DARPA, that technology was advancing rapidly in the early ‘90s. And we’ve been able to use it 
all the time in both Afghanistan and Iraq—for reconnaissance, for remote sensing, and to strike 
the enemy,” (Weinberger, 2017, p. 339). Here Cheney revealed the advantages which 
technological advancement had provided for him and his colleagues in helping him launch the 
Iraq War, and the contribution it had to sustaining America’s unilateral place in the world order. 
Reflecting on the lead-up to the Iraq War and the invasion itself, Cheney and Rumsfeld both 
seem to be the hopeful hunters for that feeling Herman Kahn described best as 
‘wargasm,’ (Weinberger, 2017, p. 115). !
≤≥ !
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM LEAD in many ways to institutional hubris. When Al-Qaeda 
attacked the United States on September 11th, 2001, the US government was aware of its 
existence, but many saw it as no great threat (Wright, 2006). However, the attacks touched 
something deep and previously undisturbed in the American psyche. The US became something 
of a sleeping giant, woken and wounded.  !
Mann (2004) notes, the Bush administration’s approach to foreign policy became “considerably 
more pronounced,” (p. xiii) after 9/11, more about fighting “evil” than eliminating the conditions 
that give rise to terrorism — the issue here is that without formulating a strategy which might cut 
off the problem at the root there could be little hope of ever actually bringing an end to Bush’s 
War on Terror. In a way, it ensured perpetual conflict.  Furthermore, the War on Terror provided 
the necessary justifications to take further action against the US’ enemies. And so the US 
stumbled into Iraq, a conflict that the literature considers a “war of choice” (Haass, 2009, & Orr, 
2004). !
As the 9/11 commissioner’s report shows, “Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, 
the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred with the full 
support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American 
people,” (Zelikow, 2004, p. 361). The events of 9/11 not only gave rise to the war on terror, they 
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ensured it was a non-partisan issue. And it wasn’t the commissioner’s report alone which 
prioritized the countering of terrorism: Many high-level members of G.W. Bush’s administration 
have admitted they at the time saw it as crucial to attack the practice of terrorism, not just Al-
Qaeda (Feith, 2008 & Bush, 2010). This distinction between a highly broad, difficult to define 
set of actions on the world stage and a singular extremist group would prove in many respects to 
contribute to the United States’ undoing. The attacks made against “terror,” did not need to be, as 
the 2002 National Security Strategy indicates, made in response to violence, but merely the 
threat thereof, seemingly in defiance of the international rules of war: “[The United States] will 
not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting preemptively 
against such terrorists,” (White House, 2002, p. 6). Understandably, the rhetoric from 
Washington leading up to the Iraq War came across to many in the world as a message of 
Americanization (Baker, 2013, p. 216). !
Because of this, the suggestion of going to war in Iraq was interpreted by most other states in the 
world as a threat to global peace (Orr, 2004). As Major General Tim Cross informed former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the US and Britain readied for war, “I do not think that we 
are ready for post-war Iraq.” Nothing came of this warning (Gaskarth, 2011, p. 409).  !
While Cross warned Blair of the dangers of getting embroiled, members of the Bush 
administration attempted to frighten senators into just this course of action through “secret 
meetings,” staged in secure rooms. Recollecting an episode from 2004, senator Ben Nelson says, 
“I was looked at straight in the face and told that UAVs could be launched from ships off the 
Atlantic coast to attack eastern seaboard cities of the United States. Is it any wonder I concluded 
that there was an imminent peril to the [US]?” (Gardner, 2013, p. 131). !
Just as Tim Cross predicted, the US and British alike were not greeted with the expected acclaim 
in Baghdad. “By the summer of 2003 a resistance movement aimed at driving US forces from 
the country had already attacked American soldiers,” (Dodge, 2010, p. 1269). A study released 
by the Pew Research Center (2003) shortly after the invasion found that the war had “widened 
the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened 
support for the war on terror, and significantly weakened global public support for…the U.N. 
and the North Atlantic alliance.”  
!
Perhaps the results were unavoidable. The visceral response to the attack on the world trade 
centers was one experienced worldwide. After 9/11 magazine in Paris ran the now-famous 
headline “We are all Americans now,” in its issue (Hare, 2004), and of the events of 9/11, Tony 
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Blair speaks of an almost religious level of inspiration he felt as a result of witnessing the 
unfolding; “The moment I saw what was unfolding and realized the scale of it and realized the 
likely use of it I did feel a really deep sense of mission.” !
≤≥ !
A SIMILAR SITUATION to the rhetoric surrounding the Iraq War could be drawn for the 
colonizing of the Philippines, the Vietnam war, the willingness of the US to support the United 
Nations but not to sign the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and so on and so forth. We see 
trends of exemptionalism and supposed American superiority appearing throughout history. The 
narrative of the aftermath to the Iraq invasion, once it got underway, is one of swift victory 
turned sour. From the invasion’s beginning, many died, always far more Iraqi than American. 
When the US left the country some eight years later, the vacuum it created birthed the Islamic 
State. Though the terrorist group is now being pushed back, there’s no getting rid of IS’ message. 
International terrorism will persist until the socioeconomic conditions that give rise to such 
movements are addressed at their root (Ikenberry et. al, 2011). !
The causes of anti-Americanism were also not mulled over, and nothing was done to remedy 
these sentiments. Part of the reason why a military response was so favored by the US was due to 
the position of key unilateral power in which it found itself in the lead-up to the Iraq War. To 
reduce international anti-American sentiment would have required a reframing of foreign policy, 
one the US was not prepared to make. !
Originally hoping to have extracted forces by September 2003 (Bensahel, 2007), the protracted 
stay in Iraq was unexpected and poorly prepared for. There were never more than 183,000 troops 
in Iraq, and at times as few as 139,000. Of those, non-US members of the coalition never 
contributed more than 17.3% of troops involved (Bensahel, 2007). Following invasion, a RAND 
corporation report showed before invasion that Iraq’s “population would require 500,000 troops 
on the ground,” to achieve stability (Bremer III, 2006, p. 10). !
Furthermore, there was no extended air campaign in Iraq before boots on the ground (Friedman, 
2004). According to Friedman (2004), there were three intelligence failures on the part of the 
United States: To understand Iran’s influence on Iraq’s Shiite population, to be aware of the 
postwar guerrilla campaign Saddam Hussein had organized, and, most tellingly to find any 
WMDs at all (p. 301). This raises a question not only of flawed intelligence but also of the ability 
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of the rhetoric employed by the members of the administration — in the absence of hard 
evidence — to use doubt to achieve the objectives they had set for themselves. 
It was not defeating Iraq’s government — under three weeks to collapse makes the war the 
swiftest conquest of a modern state to date — but the restoring of some semblance of order 
which proved to be the difficulty (Steed, 2016, p. 126). It took only 21 days to conquer Baghdad, 
with minimal casualties to the US side (139 American lives were lost) (Stephens, 2014). 
Stephens (2014) goes on to assert the failure of the Iraq war was not the choice to invade, but 
rather one of a “timid application of force,” (p. 62).  
Despite the fact that Bush’s administration and the vulcans themselves were members of the 
GOP, we must remember that Iraq was a nonpartisan affair. In a speech justifying her vote for the 
invasion of Iraq, 2008 and 2016 presidential candidate Hilary Clinton claimed it clear “that if left 
unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capability to wage biological and 
chemical warfare and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons,” (Stephens, 2014, p. 59). In a 
Gallup poll conducted in March 2003, 75% of Americans thought that it was not a mistake to 
send US troops into Iraq. 
A year after the war’s onset, Kofi Annan publicly declared the US’ choice to invade to have been 
a breaching of international law. The US had lost legitimacy, and found itself mired in a war it 
had no right to be in. When Bush’s “beacon of light,” had an opportunity to turn the eye inward 
and make lasting changes to US foreign policy, it chose instead to destabilize the ILO, and the 
rhetoric employed to sanction such action oozed with a spirit of superiority and a feeling of 
American exceptionalism. !
Beyond Iraq: Exceptionalism Elsewhere !
“What is the word, then, for those of us in the West who apply one standard to ourselves, and 
another to others?”  
—David Hare, Stuff Happens !
IRAQ IS ONE case among many for the evidencing of American Exceptionalism’s role in 
shaping the United States’ actions in the world. Though the war delegitimized the United States 
and destabilized the world order, that same ILO would not have existed were it not for American 
efforts. Though there may be a plethora of criticisms to be raised against American 
Exceptionalism, it is important to note that it is not solely a malevolent force (Lipset, 1996). !
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It was exceptionalism which lead former president Woodrow Wilson to endeavor to create the 
League of Nations, an organization which, in a post-WWI environment, he hoped would be 
capable of maintaining peace the world over (Pedersen, 2015 & Cottrell, 2018). As he said in his 
famous fourteen points speech, “The program of the world’s peace, therefore, is our program; 
and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this,” (Wilson, 1918). Herein we see 
an uncompromising nature to Wilson’s ideas of how the structures of world order should be 
imposed upon other countries. By drafting his fourteen points and presenting them as the tenets 
by which world peace might be achieved, has taken upon himself the role of agenda setter. !
Wilson’s attempts to establish LN support in the United States would also lead to his lauding of 
the capacity of Americans “to do the right thing,” (Wilson, 1919). Conveniently for Wilson, “the 
right thing,” in this case was a vote cast in support of the founding of the League of Nations, 
which came down to congress. The senate voted in favor 55-39, missing the required mark of a 
two-thirds majority (Glass, 2014). Unlike George W. Bush and the Vulcans, Wilson’s attempts to 
galvanize an exceptional interventionist spirit failed. The successes his political descendants 
would in large part be attributable to the injury caused the nation on September 11th, a catalyzing 
incident of which no equivalent existed for Wilson. In effect, he found his brand of 
exceptionalism (Wilsonian) combatting the sovereignty-loving, constitution-oriented nature of 
Tocquevillian exceptionalism, which would ultimately triumph. In effect, one interpretation of 
American greatness would be used to stifle another. !
The United Nations, following the decline and fall of the League of Nations, would become the 
US’ attempt to restore a world order fallen apart in the wake of WWII. Then-president FDR had 
learned from the mistakes of the League and Wilson alike, such as failures in forward planning. 
He began drawing up plans for the United Nations before the war had even ended (Weiss, 2015). 
When the organization was founded in 1945, it represented a landmark breakthrough, in terms of 
quantity of countries which joined its cause but also, more importantly, its creation of 
international human rights (Ignatieff, 2005).  !
Since its creation, the UN has developed, proving to be a deeply flawed organization at times and 
an extremely useful one at others. From denuclearization to fighting famine to creating the ICC, 
it has certainly had its share of successes, but failures have been met with as well — notable 
among these the genocide in Rwanda and the oil-for-food program in Iraq (Polman, 2004 & 
Spencer, 2015). !
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 Since its inception, and due to its structure, the UN has been largely unable to play much of a 
role in conflicts in which great powers have considerable interests (Jones, 2007). This has been 
demonstrated in the case of Iraq and Vietnam alike, and veto power only helps skew the balance 
of power between large states and small. However, the opportunity to create some sense of 
solidarity and union between states which it has allowed should not be cast aside as nothing at 
all. As FDR said in his 1944 state of the union address, “The one supreme objective for the 
future…Security. And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks 
by aggressors. It means also economic security, social security, moral security—in a family of 
Nations,” (Roosevelt, 1944).  !
A less flattering portrait of American exceptionalism at work is the way in which it helped 
morally sanction the illegal bombing of Cambodia, initiated by Nixon in March of 1969 (Power, 
2002). The bombing was done to target North Vietnamese transportation channels which ran 
through Cambodia. Nixon said of these, “North Vietnam…has stripped away all pretense of 
respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia.” In this demonization of North 
Vietnam’s actions, Nixon is placing America on a pedestal of moral superiority, that he might 
thereby sanction the United States’ choice to drop more bombs on Cambodia than were dropped 
by the allies in all of WWII (Grabar, 2013). This bombing campaign has been noted as one of the 
primary factors which made the rise of the Khmer Rouge possible (Mydans, 2011, & Frontline, 
2011). As Journalist Richard Dudman observed, the bombing “was radicalizing the people of 
rural Cambodia and was turning the country into a massive, dedicated, and effective rural 
base,” (Grabar, 2013). Far before the Iraq War, and in circumstances proving both positive and 
negative, we see American Exceptionalism helping to galvanize support for the US’ actions. !
Conclusion: American Exceptionalism Now !
“I believe America to be exceptional in the same way I believe the British believe in British 
exceptionalism, the Greeks in Greek exceptionalism, etc.”  
      —Barack Obama, 2013 !
ACCOMPANYING THE TRANSFORMATIONS of definition American Exceptionalism has 
undergone in recent years has been a tumultuous election season which grappled with the 
American public’s understanding of their place in the world. “American Exceptionalism,” 
became synonymous with “American Superiority,” over the course of Obama’s time in office, as 
the GOP managed to redefine it for their purposes. !
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Democratic candidate Hilary Clinton declared during the election that “America is great because 
America is good,” recycling an old misquotation of Reagan’s which attributed this phrase to 
Tocqueville. At a glance, the comment overlooks the many flaws of this country, and reminds to 
some degree of Wilson’s own aspirations for American “benevolence.” Used by Clinton as a 
retort to Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” the phrase epitomizes ideas of 
self-righteousness and superiority which have been observed appearing throughout political 
rhetoric. More than anything else, the suggestion that America is a special place because it is 
“good,” is not only reductive, it discounts much of history. A recent poll conducted by Pew did 
indeed find that though “Most Americans think America is great, but fewer think it’s the 
greatest,” (Tyson, 2014). In other words, despite the repeated assertions made by the GOP 
testifying to American superiority, there is an evident feeling that somehow the US is falling 
behind. This could be said to have started with the prolonging of the Iraq invasion, when the 
unipolar moment for the US began steadily fading into history. !
President Donald Trump wields his own brand of exceptionalism, one that reminds of a 
fundamentalist tradition, a harkening back to some former time. Like Hilary, he also borrowed 
quotes from Reagan in the 2016 election, notably his campaign slogan: It was Reagan who first 
said “Make America great again,” (Bank et. al, 2017). As he was gearing up for his campaign at 
the 2015 Conservative Political Action Conference, Donald Trump evoked the spirit of American 
Exceptionalism, participating along with other members of the GOP in attacks against Obama: 
“Maybe my biggest beef with Obama is his view that there’s nothing special or exceptional in 
America — that we’re no different than any other country,” (Jouet, 2017). But Trump’s at times 
gone against the grain when discussing American Exceptionalism. Notably, in a moment of 
agitation during an interview, he said, “What, you think [America] is so innocent?” (Bacevich, 
2017). In this off-cuff response of Trump’s we see a previously unheard-of turning of the eye 
inward, incredibly ironic given the seeming inability of the source of the comment. However, it 
is indicative of a possible larger shift in the discourse of American Exceptionalism and the way 
in which America understands both itself and its place in the world. !
Trump’s behavior in the 2016 election is its own allegory for the trajectory of American 
Exceptionalism. As Donald Trump continued to rise in first the primaries and then become the 
nominee for his party, the standards to which he were held were fundamentally different than 
those of other, career politicians. The rules of the game, indeed, seemed not to apply to him, 
because of his vitally “different,” background and his over-the-top style. Being exempted from 
following an implicit set of rules of what would normally comprise “good behavior” made it 
possible for Trump to succeed on a campaign ridden with slander and controversy. As Jouet 
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(2017) observes, it was not Trump’s fundamental position on issues which most varied from the 
usual stance taken by the GOP, but rather his style. Surely enough, many members of the GOP 
had worried that the US was becoming less exceptional, or at least of American “superiority,” 
being under threat (Jouet, 2017, p. 41). It was Trump who took the opportunity to turn this 
feeling of loss into a spirit of nostalgia, creating his own variety of American Exceptionalism. 
Whether this rhetoric ends up being capable of galvanizing or transforming US foreign policy 
over the course of Trump’s presidency remains to be seen, but it certainly played a vital role in 
getting him elected. !
Despite the worries over the US’ fall from grace, America is far from no longer being a 
preponderant superpower on the world stage. It still holds the leverage and possesses the military 
capabilities to make the same mistakes it has in the past (Iraq, Vietnam, Cambodia) through 
ignoring international treaties. In equal measure, it remains capable of effecting great change — 
its contributions to the ILO carry a weight and import which many smaller countries, states 
without traditions of exemptionalism, cannot hope to muster. Exceptionalism is engrained in the 
United States’ culture, and if history is any teacher, members of government will continue to 
invoke it well into the future, to suit their own purposes and legitimize their actions. !
The story of American Exceptionalism is fraught with twists, turns, and transformations of the 
very nature of the term’s meaning. But a use for it has always been found in the speeches and 
rhetoric of government. Other powers, such as China and Russia, continue to rise and the United 
States’ unilateral moment drifts farther into the rearview mirror. In light of this, American 
Exceptionalism’s use and meaning will most likely be re-evaluated accordingly by America’s 
political parties, to continue to find justification for those actions each are determined to take. 
Just as it is the US’ fate to continue to contend with globalization and its role in the world stage 
in a post-Iraq world, notions of exceptionalism certainly aren’t going anywhere. Though the way 
in which they are packaged and presented may differ depending on the administration or actor 
and the goal sought, American Exceptionalism will remain a quintessential force relied upon to 
influence US policy and sanction the international actions this country chooses to take. !!!!!!!
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